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Katherine Kwong*
INTRODUCTION
Genomic data have become increasingly popular with people who are eager
to learn more about themselves, their families, and their health.1 Many
individuals have sought to obtain this type of information by using third-party
services that collect and analyze genomic data, which have become popular in
part due to their relatively low price point and simple processes.2 The companies
that provide these services have become the keepers of enormous amounts of
genomic data, creating a rich source of private individuals’ information.3
The immense growth in this type of data collection has not escaped the notice
of law enforcement. Genomic data have the potential to be very useful to law
enforcement who seek to identify suspects, reconstruct crimes, or obtain
additional evidence.4 But not every piece of potential genomic evidence will
turn up a match in official law enforcement databases.5 When unable to obtain
genomic data through other methods, law enforcement may turn to third-party
businesses, seeking their customers’ genomic data.6
Many companies include clauses in their terms of service informing
customers that they will comply with law enforcement requests when legally
* J.D. student, Harvard Law School; Master of Public Health, Public Health Genetics,
University of Washington.
1 See Cathelijne H. van der Wouden et al., ‘‘Consumer Perceptions of Interactions with
Primary Care Providers After Direct-to-Consumer Personal Genomic Testing” (2016)
164:8 Ann. Intern. Med. 513; Wylie Burke and Susan Brown Trinidad, ‘‘The Deceptive
Appeal of Direct-to-Consumer Genetics” (2016) 164:8 Ann Intern Med 564.
2 23andMe, perhaps the most well-known company offering services directly to
consumers, promotes the simplicity of its $199 service by saying, ‘‘It‘s just saliva.
Provide your saliva sample from home.Mail it back to our lab in the same kit it came in
— the postage is pre-paid. We bring your genetics to you.” 23andMe, online:
<www.23andme.com>.
3 23andMe and Ancestry.com each have more than one million samples. Stephanie Lee,
‘‘As Companies Collect More Health Data, Cops Will Ask to See It”, BuzzFeed (5
November 2015), online: www.buzzfeed.com>.
4 SeeKaren J.Maschke, ‘‘DNAandLawEnforcement”, inMaryCrowley, ed., FromBirth
toDeath andBench toClinic: TheHastingsCenterBioethics BriefingBook for Journalists,
Policymakers, and Campaigns (Garrison, NY: The Hastings Center, 2008) 45.
5 Ibid.
6 Paul Elias, ‘‘LawEnforcement Investigators SeekOut PrivateDNADatabases”, Boston
Globe (26 March 2016), online: <www.bostonglobe.com>.
appropriate.7 These clauses mean companies providing third-party genomic data
services may be put in the position of providing data to law enforcement against
their customers’ wishes. While these companies obviously do not wish to be put
in a position of defying valid warrants, court orders, or subpoenas that legally
compel them to provide information, the companies must also manage customer
expectations. That means companies must consider how to design their processes
and procedures to both comply with legal requests and maintain crucial customer
relationships.
These difficult decisions are not merely a matter of speculative concern.
Companies such as Ancestry.com8 and 23andMe9 have already received requests
from law enforcement to provide genomic information these companies have
stored on their servers. This paper examines two cases studies: Ancestry.com’s
experience with law enforcement use of its genetic databases, and 23andMe’s
responses to requests for users’ genomic data. Analyzing the responses to law
enforcement requests by the two of the largest providers of third-party genomic
services provides insight into the struggles third-party genomic services are likely
to face and possible future directions for companies facing this type of law
enforcement request.
I. ANCESTRY.COM AND PUBLICLY AVAILABLE GENETIC
DATABASES
Ancestry.com, a for-profit genealogy service, operates AncestryDNA, a
service with the mission of ‘‘help[ing] everyone discover, preserve, and share their
family history through the use of genetic testing and analysis.”10 Through
AncestryDNA and related services, Ancestry.com hopes to add value to its
customers’ experiences by allowing them to connect with others who are
genetically related to them.11 AncestryDNA has collected more than one million
DNA samples,12 in addition to other genetic databases Ancestry has developed
or obtained. Unfortunately, despite Ancestry’s genealogical research intentions,
in at least one well-publicized case, genetic information made available by
Ancestry was used not just by genealogists seeking to find familial connections,
but by law enforcement searching for suspects in a crime.
7 See e.g. Ancestry, ‘‘AncestryDNA Privacy Statement” (12 June 2015), online:
<dna.ancestry.com/en/legal/us/privacyStatement>; 23andMe, ‘‘23andMe Privacy
Statement” (7 December 2015), online: <www.23andme.com/about/privacy/#Full>.
8 Ancestry, ‘‘Ancestry 2015 Transparency Report”, online: <www.ancestry.com/cs/
transparency>.
9 23andMe, ‘‘Transparency Report” (1 August 2016), online: <www.23andme.com/
transparency-report>.
10 Ancestry, ‘‘Privacy for Your AncestryDNA Test”, online: <www.ancestry.com/cs/
legal/PrivacyForAncestryDNATesting>
11 Ibid.
12 Lee, supra note 3.
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Michael Usry’s father donated his DNA years ago to the Sorenson
Molecular Genealogy Foundation, a non-profit project sponsored by the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.13 The project’s genetic database
was subsequently purchased by Ancestry, which allowed the data to be made
publicly available.14 Law enforcement officials who were investigating a 1996
murder had tried and failed to find a DNA match in national criminal databases,
but found what seemed to be a promising match with the genetic profile of Usry’s
father when they searched the data publicly available online in the Sorenson
Molecular Genealogy database.15 Although the name of the person associated
with the genetic profile was listed as ‘‘protected” in the Sorenson Molecular
Genealogy database and was not publicly available, the police used a search
warrant to obtain from Ancestry ‘‘all information including full names, date of
births, date and other information pertaining to the original donor to the
Sorenson Molecular Genealogy project.”16
The strength of the genetic match appeared to indicate that a relative of
Michael Usry’s father had left the DNA evidence at the scene of the crime.17
Police further narrowed their suspect pool down from all of the donor’s relatives
to Michael Usry based on Facebook friends in the same state as the crime, his
sisters having attended college in the state, and the types of films he made
professionally, which included killings in their plots.18 Based on this relatively
weak information, law enforcement officials were able to obtain a warrant
requiring Michael Usry to provide a DNA sample for comparison purposes.19
Ultimately, Michael Usry was not a match for the DNA evidence found at the
scene of the crime, and was eventually cleared of being a suspect in the crime.20
When asked about Michael Usry’s case, a spokesperson for Ancestry said,
‘‘On occasion when required by law to do so, and in this instance we were, we
have cooperated with law enforcement and the courts to provide only the specific
information requested but we don’t comment on the specifics of cases.”21 The
13 Jim Mustian, ‘‘New Orleans Filmmaker Cleared in Cold-case Murder; False Positive
Highlights Limitations of Familial DNA Searching”, New Orleans Advocate (8 March
2015), online: <www.theneworleansadvocate.com>.
14 Brendan Koerner, ‘‘Your Relative’s DNA Could Turn You Into a Suspect”,Wired (13
October 2015), online: <www.wired.com>.
15 Mustian, supra note 13.
16 Jennifer Lynch, ‘‘How Private DNAData Led Idaho Cops on aWild Goose Chase and
Linked an Innocent Man to a 20-Year-Old Murder Case”, Electronic Frontier
Foundation (1 May 2015), online: <www.eff.org>.
17 Koerner, supra note 14.
18 Mustian, supra note 13.
19 Ibid.
20 Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘‘Cops Seek DNA Information from Ancestry.com and
23andMe”, ABA Journal (20 October 2015), online: <www.abajournal.com>.
21 Kashmir Hill, ‘‘Cops Are Asking Ancestry.com and 23andMe for Their Customers’
Data”, Fusion (16 October 2015), online: <www.fusion.net>.
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Sorenson Molecular Genealogy database has since been removed from public
viewing, with a statement saying, ‘‘[u]nfortunately, it has come to our attention
the site has been used for purposes other than that which it was intended, forcing
us to cease operations of the site.”22 Ancestry has stated that it does not intend to
make the database publicly available again in the future.23
Removing this type of data from being available publicly is a good first step
towards ensuring that customers’ data is not used for unintended purposes. If the
Sorenson Molecular Genealogy database had not been publicly available, then
law enforcement officials would not have been able to run the genetic profile they
were seeking to match against the more than 100,000 genetic profiles24 contained
within the database. Without that initial apparent match with a publicly
available profile, the subsequent search warrants for the donor’s name and
information and Michael Usry’s DNA sample would almost certainly have not
been so easily obtained, and Ancestry would not have become the subject of
extensive news coverage about its inadvertent role as a law enforcement tool.
Ancestry has also taken proactive steps to address customers’ (and potential
customers’) concerns about the privacy of their genetic data. One element of this
is increased communication about when and how genetic data may be disclosed
by Ancestry. Both AncestryDNA’s official Privacy Statement25 and
AncestryDNA’s FAQ page26 state that DNA results will be disclosed, ‘‘as may
be required by law, regulatory authorities, or legal process,” as well as under
other described circumstances.
Ancestry has also taken steps towards increased transparency regarding its
disclosures to law enforcement. The company had previously refused to state
how many requests it received from law enforcement for its users’ data,27 but
released a Transparency Report at the end of 2015. The Transparency Report
covered all types of law enforcement requests for customer data, including non-
genomic data related to issues such as credit card fraud and identity theft.28
According to the Transparency Report,
Ancestry did not receive any requests relating to the health or genetic
information of any Ancestry member in 2015. In our history, we have
received just one request relating to DNA information — a 2014 search
warrant ordering us to provide the identity of a person based on a
DNA sample that had previously been made public for which the police
22 Sorenson Molecular Genealogy Foundation, online: <www.smgf.org>.
23 Ibid.
24 Lynch, supra note 16.
25 Ancestry, ‘‘Privacy Statement”, <dna.ancestry.com/legal/privacyStatement>.
26 Supra note 10.
27 Cassens Weiss, supra note 21.
28 Supra note 8.
102 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [15 C.J.L.T.]
had a match. We disclosed information in response to that valid
warrant.29
The Transparency Report explicitly states, ‘‘We received no requests for
information related to the health or genetic information of any Ancestry member
[in 2015], and we did not disclose any such information to law enforcement.”30
The lack of genomic data disclosure to law enforcement appears to be the
result of a lack of requests by law enforcement, rather than any company stance
on attempting to protect its customers’ data. The report’s language makes clear
that future law enforcement requests are likely to be complied with, saying,
‘‘Ancestry requires valid legal process in order to produce information about our
members. We comply with legitimate requests in accordance with our Privacy
Statements.”31 Of the 14 law enforcement requests made to Ancestry in 2015 (all
of which were for non-genomic data), the company provided the information
requested in all but one case.32
In the face of the very real possibility that Ancestry might disclose genomic
information to others, customer control over their own data is important.
Ancestry has sought to allow customers to control who has the ability to view
their genetic results, and to permanently delete their DNA test results at any
time, to ensure that no one has access.33 Allowing permanent removal of data
may be particularly important to customers who want to feel as though they
retain control over their data and how the data might be used.
II. 23andMe AND PERSONAL GENOMICS
23andMe offers direct-to-consumer genetic testing that provides personalized
information about individuals’ genomes.34 The company has sequenced more
than one million customers’ genetic information from customer supplied
biological samples.35 The data collected by 23andMe include information
about customers’ ancestry, carrier status for genetic conditions, and information
about other inherited traits,36 all of which could be used by law enforcement to
help identify individuals, or for other law enforcement purposes.
Like Ancestry, 23andMe seeks to communicate to its customers that their
data may be disclosed to law enforcement. The 23andMe Privacy Statement
includes a warning that, ‘‘23andMe will preserve and disclose any and all
29 Ibid.This statement is presumably an oblique reference to theMichael Usry case, as well




33 Supra note 10.
34 23andMe, ‘‘What You Get”, online: <www.23andme.com/service/>.
35 23andMe, ‘‘About”, online: <www.23andme.com/>.
36 Supra note 34.
THIRD-PARTY SERVICES AS POTENTIAL SOURCES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 103
information to law enforcement agencies,” when it believes it is required to do
so.37 In addition to this warning (which might not be seen by customers who do
not read the full Privacy Statement prior to signing up for 23andMe’s services),
the company’s Privacy Center, which is designed to be more accessible to
consumers, includes as section on ‘‘Law enforcement requests.”38 This type of
disclosure is important to ensure that customers are fully informed about their
potential exposure to law enforcement requests. 23andMe’s step of including the
information on a page specifically designed to communicate clearly with
customers (and not just burying it within a lengthy privacy policy) is a good
practice to help ensure that the information actually reaches customers in a way
they can understand.
To further promote customer control and choice, 23andMe also allows its
customers to decide whether their original genetic samples will be stored, how
their data are shared with other 23andMe members, and whether they wish to
participate in optional tools which might connect them to relatives (similar to
some of AncestryDNA’s tools).39 Customers are also able to delete their data at
any time, which would at least theoretically prevent the deleted data from being
utilized by law enforcement.40 While none of these steps will completely protect
existing customers from law enforcement requests for their data while they
continue to use the service, all of these measures should be seen as good practices
to follow as a baseline for protecting customer privacy.
One positive practice that should be emulated by other companies is
23andMe’s expressed preference for notifying customers affected by a law
enforcement request. 23andMe’s privacy officer told a reporter by email that,
‘‘[i]n the event we are required by law to make a disclosure, we will notify the
affected customer through the contact information provided to us, unless doing
so would violate the law or a court order.”41 This assurance is echoed for
customers on the Privacy page.42 While the effect of this policy may admittedly
be limited if law enforcement forbid such disclosure when making their requests,
it should nonetheless be considered a best practice to disclose law enforcement
requests to affected customers whenever possible.
This type of communication is part of 23andMe’s broader policies related to
transparency. The company appears to have been the first company in the
consumer health data industry to issue a transparency report, releasing its first
transparency report in October 2015.43 As part of the report, available on
37 Supra note 7.
38 23andMe, ‘‘Privacy & Data Protection”, online: <www.23andme.com/about/priv-
acy>.
39 Ibid.
40 Hill, supra note 21.
41 Ibid.
42 Supra note 38.
43 Hill, supra note 21.
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23andMe’s website, the company disclosed that, in the United States, it had
received four requests for user data that affected five user accounts.44 The
company says that it has thus far been able to avoid disclosing any of its
customers’ information to law enforcement and that it is committed to
continuing to fight law enforcement requests for data.45 23andMe has stated
that it will update the report quarterly; as of the August 1, 2016 update, these
numbers have remained unchanged.46 The 23andMe Transparency Report also
states that the company has not received any requests for customer data from law
enforcement agencies in Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, or Ireland.47
The highly positive reception48 received by 23andMe’s Transparency Report
further supports arguments that voluntary transparency and disclosure by
companies about law enforcement requests for customer data can be a net
positive for companies’ images and their relationships with their customers.
23andMe’s privacy officer has used the Transparency Report as a way of
promoting the company’s image with customers and the general public as being
concerned with its customers’ privacy. The privacy officer told a reporter that,
‘‘[t]he Transparency Report represents our dedication to being forthcoming with
our customers and doing everything we can to protecting customer
information.”49 23andMe’s announcement of its Transparency Report may
have been part of what pushed Ancestry to change its stance on releasing
information about the number of requests it has received.
If such reports become increasingly common and desirable to customers,
then they may move from a ‘‘best practice” to an ‘‘expected practice” for
companies that wish to maintain a positive image related to privacy and
transparency. Market pressures may make transparency reports even more
important for companies from a marketing perspective. Earlier adoption may be
seen as a proactive step to protect customer data and privacy, rather than a
reactive step once an incident has occurred.
Increased transparency about data usage and requests from law enforcement
has been particularly been praised by watchdog groups such as the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, which argues that divulging such requests can help
improve customer perceptions of companies such as Ancestry and encourage
accountability.50 Other groups such as the Center for Genetics and Society have
expressed concerns that a transparency report, ‘‘isn’t actually that transparent at
the end of the day,” because it may not reveal bulk collection or methods other
44 Supra note 9.
45 Hill, supra note 21.
46 Supra note 9.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Hill, supra note 21.
50 Lee, supra note 3.
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than formal requests by law enforcement made directly to the company.51
Nonetheless, transparency reports have been seen by many researchers and
groups as a positive first step in disclosing companies’ relationships with law
enforcement.
III. LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Based on the experiences of Ancestry and 23andMe, a number of lessons can
be identified for third-party services that possess customers’ genomic data, with
specific, actionable steps. These case studies demonstrate the importance of
controlling data access and providing customers with appropriate transparency
and disclosure. Additionally, while these case studies show what has happened in
the United States, third-party genomic service companies need to prepare for the
potential for law enforcement requests in other countries.
Ancestry’s experience with the Sorenson Molecular Genealogy database
demonstrates that companies should proactively examine the potential access
paths into their databases. Ancestry had the best of intentions when it allowed
the public to search its database for genetic profile matches. But even when a
company intends a data-sharing function to be used for one purpose — for
example, to find relatives, or to connect with others who share a genetic trait, or
even to encourage people to achieve fitness or health goals through increased
accountability — those functions may be used by law enforcement for other
purposes if improperly protected, or law enforcement access is provided for by
contract or policy. It is one thing to state in a privacy policy that customer data
will be disclosed to law enforcement if needed to comply with a court order or
other legal request — customers should be able to reasonably expect that
companies will not inadvertently disclose data to law enforcement.
To protect customers’ privacy, genomic data companies should, at a
minimum, ensure that data are not made publicly available; clearly state how
and when data will be shared, communicating in a manner that customers are
likely to comprehend; allow customers to decide to delete all of their data at any
time; and ensure that data are adequately protected from both a technological
and security process standpoint. An even better practice would be to default to
the most protective data sharing settings, and then educate customers about their
options when it comes to sharing their data.
23andMe’s experience with their Transparency Report is an example of the
potential positive effects that can be achieved with greater transparency. When
the number of requests is low, disclosing them is unlikely to cause consumers
undue alarm and may improve the company’s image as being open and
transparent with its customers. 23andMe has used its increased transparency as a
successful public relations tool. As more companies begin to issue transparency
reports, customers may begin to expect greater openness about law enforcement
requests for data. Moving proactively to create transparency systems prior to
51 Ibid.
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incidents will give customers a ‘‘baseline” to compare to and might increase
customer trust.
To achieve transparency goals, genomic data companies should create
reporting systems that disclose when they receive requests for data law
enforcement, including both the number of requests and the number of users
affected, as well as whether any data were provided to law enforcement in
response to the requests. Such reporting systems should be updated as frequently
as possible, to prevent long lag times between when such requests are made and
when customers have an opportunity to learn that law enforcement has requested
data from the company. Companies should also implement a policy of contacting
any affected users whenever possible (so long as it does not violate any court
orders).
Finally, companies should prepare to implement appropriate policies and
procedures for dealing with law enforcement requests in all of the countries in
which they operate. Both companies are pursuing additional international
opportunities. AncestryDNA recently expanded its operations and is now
available in a total of 35 countries.52 23andMe, already available in the United
States, Canada, and six European countries,53 is interested in expanding in China
and Southeast Asian countries.54 Both companies have international privacy
policies that contain nearly identical provisions stating that data will be disclosed
in compliance with legal or regulatory processes.55 Given the variations between
legal processes and requirements in different countries, these companies should
be careful to ensure that they remain in compliance and are prepared to
appropriately respond to any law enforcement requests in other countries.
These case studies show that genomic data collection has become an
increasingly attractive source of information for law enforcement. Companies
that collect genomic data should be aware that sooner or later, law enforcement
is likely to come seeking customer information. Learning from past experiences
and creating policies in advance will do much to protect companies against
negative incidents and bad publicity.
52 JessicaMurray, ‘‘AncestryDNANowOffered in 29NewCountries” (23February 2016),
Ancestry Blogs (blog), online: <blogs.ancestry.com>.
53 Meghana Keshavan, ‘‘23andMe’s Position on Genomic Diversity, International
Expansion” (7 February 2016), online: MedCity News <www.medcitynews.com>.
54 Caroline Humer and Christina Farr, ‘‘After Canada, UK, 23andMe Wants DNA Test
Growth Abroad”, Reuters (15 January 2015), online: <www.reuters.com>.
55 Ancestry, ‘‘AncestryDNA Privacy Statement (Outside the United States)” (18 May
2015), online: <dna.ancestry.com/en/legal/international/privacyStatement>; 23an-
dMe, ‘‘23andMe Europe — Privacy Policy” (7 Dec 2015), online: <www.23andme.-
com/en-eu/about/privacy/#Full>.
THIRD-PARTY SERVICES AS POTENTIAL SOURCES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 107
